What would a Socialist Pakistan look like?
Mehrangate volcano: 'Asghar Khan moment'
Surely, this is an "Asghar Khan moment" because the ongoing Supreme Court proceedings are centred on the petition filed by him about two decades ago.
Long withheld truths about the working of our Establishment are unfolding in all their dirty dimensions.
But what constitutes the Establishment? In Pakistan's context, it is invariably a group or class of people having institutional authority within the Pakistani society, especially those who control the civil service, the government, the armed forces, and the religious groups and parties: usually identified with a conservative outlook.
One would be only profoundly naïve to deduce that the then-Chairman of Senate of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, was the successor of General Ziaul Haq after the latter died in a C-130 plane crash in Bahawalpur in 1988.
Although, the former became the President of Pakistan, the man who was calling the shots had not ensconced himself in the Presidency in Islamabad but he was still within the four walls of the army headquarters situated in Rawalpindi.
The then army chief, General Aslam Beg, one of the principal characters of the Mehrangate scandal, had allegedly conceived and planned the scheme only to be executed through the most efficient executive arm of the executive: the ISI.
The job of disbursement of money among politicians with a view to depriving the PPP of a victory in the 1990 general election was efficiently carried out by the country's premier intelligence outfit.
The achievement of this "profound" task effected with a lot of finesse and care added a new feather to ISI's cap already having too many feathers thanks to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s.
Since then, both the army and the ISI had taken upon themselves the responsibility of determining what constitutes the national interest.
Working in tandem, both the institutions identified the country's goals and ambitions, whether military or economic.
As considerable disagreement exists in the country over what is or is not in "the national interest," these two institutions or power groups of the Establishment often invoke "the national interests" to justify isolationist and pacifistic policies as to justify interventionist or war-like policies.
Arguably, Kargil misadventure is a case in point.
Since the principal accused in this case is the Inter-Service Intelligence, headed by an appointee of the Chief Executive, and there is its Political Wing established by a civilian prime minister - it would be of interest to the general public why the loot sale made through a private bank remained unexplored for so long.
And why the 'misdeed' of the ISI has come under sharper focus.
Why the simmering Mehrangate volcano has burst with full fury on the national scene now? But the public's right to know the truth in the alleged distribution of public money, a whopping Rs 400 million, by the ISI to ensure the PPP won't come back to the power corridors, should override all other considerations.
Even when the recipients of secret funds vehemently reject the allegations and may turn around to say the whole exercise is aimed at defaming them and undercutting their popularity the task is of finding the whole truth is very much achievable.
But the details spelled out by Younus Habib certainly lift one more layer from this sordid drama.
True, no person with an iota of intelligence would give receipts of receiving the ISI funds and that he would deny the charge with full force.
But the sources of these funds do keep record as a bank will invariably do.
Then, it is also quite plausible that somewhere in the vaults of the ISI there is the record of actual recipients and as to what channel was employed for delivering money to them.
So, the case is not likely to be decided anytime soon, but it is our sanguine expectation that the apex court would go to the bottom of the Mehrangate scam, the guilty would be identified, agencies would be asked to recognise certain 'redlines' and there would be a clear and an unambiguous definition of 'the national interest'.
The greater emphasis of apex court's proceedings should be aimed at contributing to efforts towards the setting up of a 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' in sharp contrast to Nuremberg Trials and other de-Nazification measures.
Once established through a legislative act, the commission may be empowered to grant amnesty to a person or persons as long as there is full disclosure by the person seeking amnesty.
Indeed, it is a glorious moment of our national history.
Chief Justice of Pakistan has promised to strengthen the institutions, a mission to which the apex court's verdict on the Asghar Khan petition would be a giant step.
East Pakistan, Balochistan, and now Sindh
DAILY TIMES
by:Mohammad Ali Mahar
The PPP was always seen as a ray of hope for the Sindhis for a long time. A kind of last refuge. This administration has brought a common Sindhi to the point where he feels robbed of this hope. If ever there existed a Sindh card, the government has already sold it to its coalition partners for a few years in power
When in the 19th century (1851 AD), Richard Francis Burton wrote about Sindh, he titled his book Scinde, or the Unhappy Valley. And, when Roger Pearce, ICS, penned his memoirs about his experiences in the 20th century Sindh (1938-1948), he named the book Once a Happy Valley. What, one wonders, would a 21st century foreigner title his book were he to venture into today’s molested, manipulated, robbed, unemployed, crime-riddled, dacoit-infested, terrorised Sindh?
Sixteen well-timed bomb explosions on the railway tracks, rocking one end of Sindh to the other, should serve as an alarm bell to those who rule the destiny of otherwise tranquil, though hapless, Sindhis, who never react until an extreme provocation befalls them. What led the slumbered nation to wake up with so much violence needs to be analysed.
I visit Sindh almost every couple of years. As soon as I step outside Karachi, I find the province in worse shape than ever before. I ask people around me to name one sincere politician, bureaucrat, or academic. In response, I receive a blank gaze, as they try to think of one. They can name a few. One elder in a village said to me, “Stop looking for them. Sincere Sindhi leaders have been long been liquidated.” What is left is a miserable lot emasculated through the merciless ‘hidden hands’ or by their greed. Meanwhile, the loot sale of Sindhi resources is on.
The situation is not the work of one day. Throughout the history of Pakistan, except for a brief respite during Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto’s era, Sindh has been denied its fair share in everything. Nawaz Sharif placed a bar on employment in the country in 1996. Ever since that day, the Sindhi youth has seen little in the name of jobs. One sees throngs of unemployed youths loitering in the streets of towns and villages in the province. During the whole Musharraf period, all the economic activity and funds — meaning new jobs — meant for the whole of Sindh, went to the development of the city of Karachi. The dawn of the era at the demise of Musharraf’s misrule has brought forward the bane of nepotism and corruption -- moral as well financial -- where jobs go to either those who can grease the right palms or the scions of the powerful. The poor Sindhi, who is indeed in a vast majority, not related to a political bigwig and with not enough money to buy employment, is jobless as well as helpless. The doors of federal employment are closed to the Sindhi as ever before — statistics produced in parliament in the last few days showed less than a fraction of federal government jobs meant for Sindh-domiciled candidates going to the rightful unemployed.
As regards education and healthcare, the less said the better. To demand those would be tantamount to asking for the stars.
The PPP was always seen as a ray of hope for the Sindhis for a long time. A kind of last refuge. This administration has brought a common Sindhi to the point where he feels robbed of this hope. If there ever existed a Sindh card, the government has already sold it to its coalition partners for a few years in power. The blockage of a bill in the Sindh Assembly against an amendment favouring the division of provinces — a prelude to Sindh’s disintegration in the eyes of a common Sindhi — has only reinforced his sense of betrayal and suspicion of this regime.
The pain hurting the Sindhi body politic is severe, so severe that it has started to be felt even by the far flung Sindhis, forging foreign-based Sindhi organisations such as Sindhi Association of North America (SANA). The natives too view the recent interest of expatriate Sindhis in the affairs and wellbeing of Sindh with renewed hope. The reason the recent conference sponsored by SANA in Karachi has been so very well received is that the common man, as well as the elite in Sindh, have started looking for an alternative. An alternative that could deliver the much needed succour and reforms Sindh so badly craves.
Despite all its good intentions, however, SANA — having held a position of responsibility at its cabinet, I can only speak about SANA — may not be in a position to offer the much needed political support. The reasons being that it is not an organisation aimed for the purpose, and neither is there any desire in the expatriate Sindhis to remote-control Sindh. Whatever the solution, it has to come from within Sindh itself.
And Sindhis understand that too. A very successful rally by the local media mogul, Ali Kazi at Bhit Shah, which was able to gather thousands of people without the support of a political force, may very well have been the fruit of that understanding. But this is what Sindhis can do for themselves. The responsibility also needs to be felt by the real handlers of the destiny of the country.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto spoke very wisely when he said, in some other context, on September 21, 1968, at the Sindh Convention of PPP: “If this continues...the people will rise in rebellion, and there will be bloodshed and civil war in the country. I am not prophesying. It is logic. I might be accused of spreading rebellion. Well, I will do that, if needed. I fear no one.”
Not learning a lesson from the debacle of East Pakistan has brought Balochistan to the point where it is at the brink of ending its ties with the rest of the country, and the blame is being put on the ‘foreign element’ and the ‘misguided’ Baloch. If the real powers running the country refuse to hear the cries of Sindhis at this time, they would have no one to blame but themselves.